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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
a crime which was "about to be committed.12 7 This further suggests the
awareness that a modernization of arrest privileges is needed to make
them consistent with the conditions under which the police today must
protect the public.
Thomas P. Ruane
EvmENcE-Wiretapping-Extension Telephones-The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has outlined the prohibitive reach of the wiretap statute as
encompassing mechanical invasions over telephone extensions and listen-
ing on an extension without the consent of the communicating parties.
Commonwealth v. Murray, 423 Pa. 37, 223 A.2d 102 (1966).
The defendant, an employee of Summit Industries, contacted an old
acquaintance and employee of a competitive firm, Lanston Company, and
offered him a sum of money in exchange for confidential company in-
formation. This solicitation was reported to the Lanston officials and an
effort was made to secure evidence in order to prosecute the defendant
under the Penal Code of 19391 for offering to bribe or bribing a corporate
employee. Private detectives were hired and they instructed the Lanston
employee to telephone the defendant and make further arrangements for
the transfer of the information while they listened on an extension phone
and recorded the conversation with a mechanical device attached to the
extension.2
Using the evidence that the detectives secured by listening on the ex-
tension phone the trial court convicted the defendant3 despite defense's
protestations that what was overheard was inadmissable under the Act
of July 16, 1957, P.L. 956 section 1 which makes it a crime to "intercept
a communication by telephone or telegraph without permission of the
parties to such communication." 4 The Superior Court affirmed the con-
27. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 5, 223 A.2d 873, 875 (1966).
1. The statute provides in pertinent part: "Whoever offers or gives to any agent, em-
ployee, or servant of another ... any commission, money, property or other valuable thing,
without the knowledge and consent of the principal employer, or master as an inducement,
bribe, . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 667 (1963).
2. The detectives took the contacted employee to their office and attached the device to
their switchboard to record the conversation and simultaneously listened in while the
employee phoned the call.
3. It should be noted that the evidence obtained by use of the mechanical recording was
excluded under the Pennsylvania "wiretap" statute and specifically distinguished from
evidence secured by listening over the extension.
4. The statute provides in pertinent part: "No person shall intercept a communication
by telephone or telegraph without permission of the parties to such communication. No
person shall install or employ any device for overhearing or recording communications pass-
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viction but rejected the distinction drawn by the trial court between the
mechanical eavesdropping and the overhearing and held that the Act of
1957 did not prevent the use of either method.'
Speaking for the court, Justice Musmanno reversed the holding of the
Superior Court and interpreted the legislative intent and terminology as
proscribing admission of all evidence secured by recording a conversation
over an extension without the consent of the communicating parties. It
was found as a matter of fact that the detective's testimony was so tainted
by his reliance on the recording that independent testimony as to what
he had heard eight months before was virtually inconceivable' and, there-
fore, the only determination made on the facts was that any evidence
obtained through the use of a recording device attached to an extension
violated the statute. In the court's opinion no procedure could more
flagrantly violate the statute's proscriptions, for the unequivocal wording
"interception" and "device for overhearing" manifestly demonstrate the
legislature's aversion to all such forms of "wiretapping." 7
The court did not, however, limit its holding to the facts of the instant
case, but extended its interpretation of the statute by hypothesizing that
even had there been no mechanical device used in the case, merely over-
hearing a conversation on an extension phone constitutes a violation of
the statute. It arrived at this construction by emphasizing the sanctity of
an individual's right to privacy and rejecting all alleged distinctions be-
tween using a mechanical device to record a conversation and listening
on an extension as mechanical and artificial.
The dearth of Pennsylvania precedent interpreting this aspect of the
statute well reflects the basis for the divergent views expressed on the
present court8 and would indicate that their decision was probably dic-
ing through a telephone or telegraph line with intent to intercept a communication in viola-
tion of this act. No person shall divulge or use the contents or purport of a communication
intercepted in violation of this act. . . .PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2443 (1958).
5. Commonwealth v. Murray, 206 Pa. Super. 298, 213 A.2d 162 (1965). It held that
neither using a recording device on an extension nor overhearing on an extension were
"interceptions" within the statute.
6. Using the detective's admission that his testimony was based on the recording the
instant court reversed the trial court's factual determination that he testified from his own
recollection.
7. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), it was conclusively established
that wiretapping was not prohibited by the Constitution. So at the very least, the Penn-
sylvania statute was drafted to prevent those elementary forms of wiretapping involving the
attachment of mechanical devices to means of communication.
8. Justice Musmanno in speaking for the court spoke only for himself and Justice Bell.
Concurring, Justice Eagen, with whom Justice Jones joined, agreed with the factual holding
but believed that the statute was being misconstrued when it was applied merely to over-
hearing on an extension. Also concurring was Justice Roberts, with whom Justice O'Brien
joined, and unequivocally construed the Pennsylvania statute as- proscribing the use of
mechanical devices on extension phones as well as overhearing, but took time to attempt to
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tated by personal predilections rather than by a construction of legal
dogma. In Commonwealth v. Smith9 evidence was admitted that an officer
overheard by answering a telephone while participating in a gambling
raid, and in Commonwealth v. Bruno10 a recipient of a call was permitted
to use in evidence a recording of that call. Although the court does not
mention either of these cases in its opinion and neither of them are
conclusively determinative of the law as it pertains to extension inter-
loping, it would not have been unreasonable for the court in applying the
latter case to arrive at a contrary result. For if the legislative intent allows
an individual to tape his own conversation and then divulge it to another
without the consent of the other party, then it should be no greater an
intrusion of privacy for that same person to permit another to listen in. on
a different device within his possession, i.e., a telephone extension.
Additional support for a contrary interpretation could have been found
in the United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Rathbun,"
in which under a federal statute similar in nature to Pennsylvania's12
the Court interpreted the legislative intent as permitting the overhearing
of a conversation over an extension phone." However, the instant court
dismissed the Rathbun decision as inapplicable because of different con-
sensual requirements. 4 But perhaps the decision was erroneously con-
sidered, for the holding was not based on the consensual requirements
but instead revolved around the interpretation of "interception" as. not
including overhearing on permanent family conveniences such as exten-
sion phones. 5 And since this was the very issue that concerned the present
court, it could have used the federal decision as a guideline in examining
the reach of the Pennsylvania act.
solve some of the ramifications of the decision that Justice Musmanno skirted. Justice Cohen
vehemently dissented, contending that neither the recording device nor the overhearing were
interceptions within the act in light of the Rathbun decision. And that even if the recording
was illegal the detective's testimony should have been admitted because it was certainly
independent testimony not based on the recording.
9. 186 Pa. Super 89, 140 A.2d 347 (1958).,
10. 203 Pa. Super 541, 201 A.2d 434 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 965 (1964).
11. 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
12. The statute provides in pertinent part: "... and no person not being authorized by
the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence . . . or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person ... " 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) ; 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1962).
13. This statute was held not to be binding on the states in United States v. Schwartz,
344 U.S. 199 (1952).
14. It should be noted that the federal act requires the consent of only the sender to
permit an interception, whereas the Pennsylvania act requires the consent of all the com-
municating parties.
15. See Bradley and Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46
GFo. L.J. 418, 441 (1958) and Meletzke, Admissability in Federal Courts of Evidence Over-
heard on Extension Phones, 19 Onio L.J. 345, 349 (1958) as concluding that it was the
interpretation of "interception" on which the ultimate decision hinged.
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No matter how explicit and lucid a court is in interpreting a statute,
there inheres in its decision, as in the instant case, perplexing ramifications
for future cases involving similar though not identical facts. As indicated
by the dissenting opinion,16 many ordinary business and family practices
of overhearing phone calls would seem to be prohibited by the broad
interpretation of the statute that was given by the court, unless such
situations are regarded, as some writers suggest, 17 as implying consent by
the communicating parties' 8 or treating the eavesdropper as an alter ego
of one of the parties, and thus taking the "interception" outside of the
statute. Another potential problem is the restrictions on usual police
tactics employing extension phones for law enforcement; but possibly the
solution to that problem is to treat such procedures as unwarranted in-
vasions of an individual's privacy which should be curtailed.
Such minor uncertainties can easily be resolved as they arise and should
not overshadow the advantages derived from the court's commendable
interpretation assuring the individual's right to privacy. Furthermore,
although the holding on the facts, prohibiting the unconsented use of
mechanical devices on extension phones, is unassailable under the wording
of the act, the extended interpretation also proscribing listening on an
extension absent mechanical devices, could have been adversely in-
fluenced by proper consideration of the Rathbun decision and Pennsyl-
vania precedent in the area. However, it should be kept in mind that
these considerations were only discretionary in their application and
their disregard in no way vitiates the soundness or validity of the court's
conclusions, but rather reflects the court's political and social concern to
bridge the gap of constitutional deficiency and preserve a most basic
freedom-the right to privacy.
David J. Pleva
16. 423 Pa. at 65, 223 A.2d at 116 (1966).
17. See United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.), suggesting
that the rationale of implied consent can be used to handle such problems.
18. Using a similar rationale the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 208 Pa.
Super. 513, 224. A.2d 91 (1966) excluded a unique fact situation from the purview of the
statute where a telephone subscriber attached a mechanical device to his home phone in an
effort to record conversations between his wife and her paramour. The court held that such
actions did not violate the Act of 1957 because the act was not designed to prevent a sub-
scriber from "intercepting" for a "rightly paramount purpose". Basing its rationale on a
New York decision the court held that "When such a subscriber consents to the use of his
line, by his employee or by a member of his household, or by his wife, there is a condition
implied that the telephone will not be used to the detriment of the subscriber's business,
household or marital status." The conclusions in this case, however, appear unsubstantiated
since the wording of the act in no way imparts such an exclusion as arrived at in this case
and hopefully the decision will be reconsidered if taken on appeal.
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